ABSTRACT. We study utility indifference prices and optimal purchasing quantities for a contingent claim, in an incomplete semi-martingale market, in the presence of vanishing hedging errors and/or risk aversion.
INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to study the relationship between utility indifference prices and optimal positions for a contingent claim, in a general incomplete semi-martingale market, under the assumption of vanishing hedging errors. In particular, for an exponential utility investor, we wish to verify the heuristic adage that when purchasing optimal quantities one obtains the delicate relationship position size × risk aversion × incompleteness parameter ≈ constant.
Here, the incompleteness parameter represents the hedging error associated with the claim. From the above we see that as the market becomes complete (or, at least as the given claim in question becomes asymptotically hedgeable), optimal position sizes tend to become large. In fact, optimal position sizes may also become large as risk aversion vanishes in a fixed market, and our analysis is robust enough to cover both cases.
The financial motivation for studying this situation is that large positions are indeed being taken. For example, the over the counter derivatives markets now has more than 700 trillion notional outstanding (see [7] ). Other examples include mortgage backed securities, life insurance contracts and mortality derivatives.
These products are not completely replicable and a position on them implies unhedgeable risk. Therefore, it is natural to study the situation within the framework of utility based analysis in incomplete markets.
Moreover, the observation that position size is connected to hedging error can be understood as follows.
In a complete market there is only one fair price d for a given claim. Hence, if one is able to purchase claims for price p = d then it is optimal to take an infinite position. Of course, in reality one cannot take an infinite position and complete markets are an ideal situation. However, these considerations indicate that large positions may arise endogenously, if the hedging error or risk aversion is small. We also mention that this is the underlying motivation for the indifference price approximations in the basis risk models of [12, 21] , which we revisit in the current paper.
Starting at least from [22] , utility indifference pricing has attracted a lot of attention, see for example [9] for detailed overview. Recently, indifference pricing for large position sizes has been studied in [8, 33, 34] . In [34] the authors consider a sequence of a particular semi-complete market indexed by n that becomes complete as n → ∞ and, assuming the unhedgeable component of the non-traded asset vanishes in accordance to a Large Deviation Principle (LDP), it is shown that optimal purchase quantities become large at precisely the Large Deviations scaling.
To help motivate our results, let us briefly outline the main idea. Let n ∈ N and consider a semimartingale market with available risky assets for investment S n , and an investor who owns a non-traded contingent claim B. The investor has exponential utility with risk aversion a n > 0, where, in addition to the assets, we allow the risk aversion to change with n so that U an (x) = −(1/a n )e −anx , x ∈ R. Let A n be the set of admissible trading strategies and X π n = (π n · S n ) be the resultant wealth process, for some π n ∈ A n . The optimal utility that the investor can achieve by trading in S n with initial capital x and q units of B is It is well known that p n an does not depend upon x, and writing p n an (q), takes the form p n an (q) = − 1 a n q log E Q n 0 e −anqŶ n an (q)
, where Q n 0 is the minimal entropy measure in the n th market andŶ n an (q) is related to the normalized residual risk (see [1, 31] amongst others) of owning q units of B. Thus, p n an can be viewed as a "generalized" version of the scaled cummulant generating function Λ n (q)/q, where Λ n (q) := log E e qYn for a sequence of random variables {Y n } from Large Deviations theory (see [15] for a classical manuscript). Taking a cue from the celebrated Gärtner-Ellis theorem, which deduces an LDP for the tail probabilities of {Y n } from the assumption that λ → (1/r n )Λ n (λr n ) converges to a sufficiently regular function as r n → ∞, we naturally ask what conclusions can be deduced from the assumption that ℓ → p n an (ℓr n ) converges to a well defined limit for ℓ ∈ R and r n → ∞. Specifically, we assume (see Assumption 3.3) that there exist a sequence {r n } of positive numbers with r n → ∞ and a δ > 0 such that for all |ℓ| < δ the limit
exists, is finite, and is continuous at ℓ = 0. The price p ∞ (0) is thus the limiting price ignoring position size, and when the market is asymptotically complete, represents the unique arbitrage free price in the limiting complete market: see Section 4.3.
As a first consequence, we prove (see Theorems 4.3, 4.4) that large optimal positions arise endogenously at a rate proportional to r n . Specifically, for any pricep n which is arbitrage free in the pre-limiting markets, the optimal position size (as defined in [24] )q n =q n (p n ) is such that for n large enough |q n | ≈ ℓr n , for some ℓ ∈ (0, ∞), provided thatp n →p = p ∞ (0). Namely, we have |q n | → ∞ at the speed of r n .
Secondly, in Section 5 we show under which conditions the large claim regime could arise in an equilibrium setting, with a particular focus on justifying the assumption that, asymptotically, one could buy the claim for a pricep = p ∞ (0). Provided that stock market prices are exogenously given, the equilibrium price of a claim is the one at which the optimal quantities of the investors sum up to zero, meaning that the market of the claim is cleared out. If such a (partial) equilibrium price exists for each n ∈ N, it is natural to ask where this sequence converges to, and if the prices induce investors to enter the large claim regime. Here, we show that if the investors' random endowments are dominated by r n , then equilibrium prices converge to p ∞ (0); the unique limiting arbitrage free price. However, if investors' endowments are growing with rate r n , equilibrium prices may converge to a limitp = p ∞ (0) and hence the large claim regime of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 occurs. This happens when one investor already owns large position in B, and yields a family of examples where the large claim regime is in fact the market's equilibrium. This result helps to explain the large observed volumes in OTC derivative markets and the corresponding extreme prices that often appear (see for instance [2, 7] ).
Thirdly, we illustrate through numerous and varied examples that the price convergence in (1.1) holds, and hence is a natural feature of either asymptotically complete markets or vanishing investor's risk aversion in a fixed market. Moreover, in all of these examples we explicitly identify the speed r n at which optimal positions grow. To be precise, we validate these claims in the following cases: (a) vanishing risk aversion The vanishing transaction costs example of Section 7 probably deserves more discussion. The first interesting point is that our theory unifies frictionless markets and markets with frictions, such as transaction costs. In particular, not only do the statements on optimal positions in frictionless markets carry over, but in both cases, the main results turn out to be natural outcomes of the same general statements presented in Appendix A. The second interesting point is that our analysis reveals that the natural relation between risk aversion, a n , optimal position size,q n , and proportion of the transaction costs, λ n is a nqn λ 2 n ≈ constant. Apart from the conclusion that for fixed risk aversion, this relation indicates that r n = λ −2 n , i.e. that q n λ 2 n → ℓ ∈ (0, ∞), it also justifies the appropriateness of the limiting asymptotic regimes, which were considered previously without justification; for example, as in [4, 23] .
Even though our focus in this paper is on investors with exponential utility, our results are also true within the class of utility functions that decay exponentially for large negative wealths, see Section 4.5. In this case, the optimal position is not necessarily unique. However, we prove that optimizers do exist and that under the assumption of convergence of indifference prices with speed r n , for exponential utility, each optimizer will converge to ±∞ with speed r n .
We conclude the introduction with a discussion on the applicability and usefulness of the results of this paper. First of all, our analysis offers a bridge between complete and incomplete markets. Complete markets, where computations are often tractable and explicit, are clearly an idealization of reality. However, their more realistic incomplete counterparts are typically intractable when it comes to identifying optimal trading strategies and pricing contingent claims. To connect these two settings, it is thus natural to consider small perturbations away from complete markets. In the case of fixed investor preferences, this paper addresses precisely this situation, and we show that as the perturbation vanishes, large investors may endogenously arise through optimal trading. Secondly, our work also acts as a bridge between risk averse and risk neutral investors. For example, it is often assumed that market makers are risk neutral, which is of course only approximately true. Our analysis shows, however, that as market makers approach risk neutrality, they will be induced into both taking large positions and offering prices so that other buyers enter into the market in a large way. Thirdly, the equilibrium results of Section 5 show that it takes only one person to be in the large claim regime in order for others to enter that regime by acting optimally. Hence, our results can be also used to both study and justify the emergence of large players in derivative markets, in the setting where players take large positions immediately, as opposed to incrementally increasing their position sizes.
Fourthly, our work can help towards correctly pricing claims in the presence of small unheadgable risks (e.g. in the insurance industry), when positions are of significant size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in detail the model and the optimal investment problem. In Section 3 we lay down our main assumption on convergence of scaled indifference prices and draw motivations with and connections to Large Deviations theory. In Section 4 we describe the main consequences of the assumption of convergence of scaled indifference prices. Namely, we state the theorems on optimal positions and discuss their consequences. We additionally discuss the limiting behavior for the optimal wealth process, and justify the interpretation that the speed r n characterizes the speed at which the market approaches completion. Moreover, we prove that the general results on optimal positions are true for all utility functions in the class of utility functions that decay exponentially for large negative wealths. Section 5 contains the results on the partial equilibrium model and on its limiting behavior.
Section 6 contains the motivating examples of frictionless markets that satisfy our assumptions. Section 7 contains the example with vanishing transaction costs. Appendices A, B, and C contain most of the proofs.
THE MODEL, OPTIMAL INVESTMENT PROBLEM AND INDIFFERENCE PRICE
We fix a horizon T > 0, probability space (Ω, F, P) and filtration F = (F t ) 0≤t≤T , which is assumed to satisfy the usual conditions. Additionally, we assume F = F T and zero interest rates so the risk-free asset is identically equal to 1. For n ∈ N we denote by S n an R dn -valued, locally bounded semi-martingale which represents the risky assets available for investment. In the sequel, we consider the valuation and the optimal position taking in a contingent claim B ∈ L 0 (Ω, F, P) assumed to satisfy: Assumption 2.1. E e λB < ∞ for all λ ∈ R.
Since the assets are changing with n, the class of equivalent local martingale measures are changing with n as well. We denote by M n the family of measures Q n ∼ P on F such that S n is a Q n local martingale. Recall for two probability measures µ ≪ ν the relative entropy of µ with respect to ν is given by H (µ | ν) = E ν [(dµ/dν) log(dµ/dν)]. In order to rule out arbitrage in each market, we make the following standard assumption as seen in [14, 18] amongst many others:
We consider an exponential utility investor with risk aversion a n > 0, where, in addition to the assets, we allow the risk aversion to change with n. Thus, the investor has utility function
A trading strategy π n is admissible if it is predictable, S n integrable, and if the stochastic integral X π n := (π n · S n ) is a Q n supermartingale for all Q n ∈M n . The set of admissible trading strategies for the n th market is denoted A n . For an initial capital x and position q ∈ R in the claim B we define
as the optimal utility an investor can achieve by trading in S n with initial capital x and q units of B. When q = 0 so that the investor does not own the claim we denote the value function by
The average (bid) utility indifference price p n an (x, q) for initial capital x and q units of B is defined through the balance equation
We now summarize a number of well known results regarding the utility maximization problem for exponential utility under the current setup and assumptions. For proofs of these facts, see [14, 18, 19, 26, 30, 32] .
Since u n an (x, q) = e −anx u n an (0, q) we consider without loss of generality that x = 0 throughout. The value function without B, u n an (0), is attained by an admissible strategyπ n an (0). WriteX n an (0) := Xπ n an (0)
as the optimal wealth process. Additionally, denote by Q n 0 ∈M n the minimal entropy measure, which exists. Then Q n 0 andX n an (0) are related by the formula
In a similar fashion, the value function for q units of B, u n an (0, q), is also attained for some admissible trading strategyπ n an (q) and we writeX n an (q) := Xπ n an (q) as the resultant wealth process. The indifference price does not depend upon the initial capital and we write p n an (q) instead of p n an (x, q). By its definition, p n an (q) is given by the abstract formula
, (2.6) and the total price qp n an (q) admits the variational representation
Note that from (2.7) one can easily deduce that for q ∈ R
Also, using (2.5) and (2.6) we obtain
Y n an (q) is intimately related to the normalized residual risk process of [1, 31, 37] amongst others and can be seen as the per unit unhedgeable part of the long position on q units of the claim B.
3. LIMITING PRICES AND CONNECTIONS TO LARGE DEVIATIONS THEORY Equation (2.9) is the starting point for our analysis. To motivate the result we first make connections with the Large Deviation Principle (LDP) and Gärtner-Ellis theorem from Large Deviations, both stated here for the convenience of the reader, see for example [15] . Definition 3.1. Let S be a Polish space with Borel sigma-algebra B(S) and (Ω, F, P) be a probability space. We say that a collection of random variables {Y n } n∈N from Ω to S has a LDP with good rate function I : S → [0, ∞] and scaling r n if r n → ∞ and (1) For each s ≥ 0, the set Φ(s) = {s ∈ S : I(s) ≤ s} is a compact subset of S; in particular, I is lower semi-continuous.
In this paper we take S = R. Theorem 3.2 (Gärtner-Ellis). Let {Y n } n∈N be a collection of random variables on a probability space (Ω, F, P). Let {r n } n∈N be a sequence of positive reals such that lim n↑∞ r n = ∞. For each n denote by Λ n the cummulant generating function for Y n (3.1)
Assume the following regarding Λ n :
(1) For all λ ∈ R the limit Λ(λ) := lim n↑∞ (1/r n )Λ n (r n λ) exists as an extended real number.
Then, the random variables {Y n } n∈N satisfy a LDP with speed {r n } n∈N and good rate function I(y) = sup λ∈R (λy − Λ(λ)).
To connect Theorem 3.2 with the indifference price in (2.9), assume that the position size q takes the form q = ℓr n for ℓ ∈ R, where {r n } n∈N is a sequence of positive reals with lim n↑∞ r n = ∞. In this case, using (2.9) gives
where, similarly to Λ n above, we set
.
We thus see that convergence of the indifference prices p n an (ℓr n ) is analogous to the Gärtner-Ellis assumption that the scaled cummulant generating functions (1/r n )Λ n (ℓr n ) converge. However, besides the dependence of probability measure on n, there is a substantial difference between Γ n in (3.3) and Λ n in (3.1):
namely, the random variablesŶ n an (λ) of (3.3) are changing with λ whereas the random variables Y n of (2.10) are not. Thus, even though convergence of the scaled indifference prices implies a connection with a LDP for the random variablesŶ n an (λ), we do not typically expect a LDP from random variablesŶ n an (λ) unless they do not actually depend upon λ. An example where this is the case is presented in Section 6.3 below.
We now make the main assumption in an analogous form to the Gärtner-Ellis theorem. Assumption 3.3. There exist a sequence {r n } n∈N of positive reals with lim n↑∞ r n = ∞ and a δ > 0 such that for all |ℓ| < δ the limit
exists and is finite. In particular, with 
From here, it immediately follows that if the market is fixed: i.e. if p n 1 (q n ) = p 1 (q n ) for all n and q n , then if a n → 0 we may set r n := a −1 n → ∞ and Assumption 3.3 holds. Indeed, p 1 (ℓa n r n ) = p 1 (ℓ) =: p ∞ (ℓ) and continuity at 0 follows from [14] which shows that
. This example is briefly additionally discussed in Section 6.1 below, and Theorems 4.3, 4.3 not withstanding, our focus in the sequel will lie primarily on the case of fixed risk aversion in a sequence of varying markets.
Assumption 3.3 and Vanishing Hedging Errors.
Though not explicitly stated, for a fixed risk aversion a n ≡ a, Assumption 3.3 implies the hedging errors associated B are vanishing. This follows both from the convergence of scaled indifference prices p n a (ℓr n ) and, crucially, from the assumption that p ∞ is continuous at 0. To see this latter point, consider again when the market is fixed so p n a (q n ) = p a (q n ). Here, for a bounded claim B, as shown in [14, 32] , we have
Thus, the convergence requirement in Assumption 3.3 holds, but the resultant function p ∞ is not continuous at 0, so Assumption 3.3 cannot hold in a fixed market (or when there is a limiting market but B is not replicable in this market).
Alternatively, consider when all of Assumption 3.3 holds. Firstly, (2.7) implies that q → p n an (q) is decreasing and q → qp n an (q) is concave. Thus, ℓ → ℓp n an (ℓr n ) is concave as well and, for |ℓ| < δ, so is ℓ → ℓp ∞ (ℓ). In particular, p ∞ (ℓ) is continuous on (−δ, 0) and (0, δ). Thus, additionally assuming continuity of p ∞ at 0 (and hence on all of (−δ, δ)), we obtain the useful result: [14] for a proof of this equivalence.
Indeed, take ε > 0 so that (ℓ − ε)r n ≤ q n ≤ (ℓ + ε)r n for all n large enough. Since p n an (q) is decreasing:
Taking ε ↓ 0 gives the result. In particular, for all fixed position sizes q and risk aversions a, we have that lim n↑∞ p n a (q) = d, and this essentially implies the existence of trading strategies π n ∈ A n which asymptotically hedge B. This argument is expanded upon, in the case of bounded claims and a continuous filtration, in Section 4.3 below. 
LIMITING SCALED INDIFFERENCE PRICES AND CONSEQUENCES
We now deduce a number of consequences of Assumption 3.3, the first of which is that the regime where the position size q = q n = ℓr n is the appropriate one as n ↑ ∞, if the considered positions are taken optimally. Here, we follow the approach of [24, 33, 34] B n := inf
Assume, for all n, that B cannot be replicated by trading in S n , and denote by I n the range of arbitrage free prices for B: i.e.
Forp n ∈ I n the optimal positionq n =q n (p n ) is defined as the unique (see [24] ) solution to the equation
As shown in [24] ,q n satisfies the first order conditions for optimality
where Qq n(p n ) ∈M n is the dual optimizer forq n (p n ) units of claim B in that it achieves the infimum in (2.7). To perform the asymptotic analysis we assume consistency (in n) between the markets and nondegeneracy in prices as n ↑ ∞. More precisely: First of all, it may be that I n is collapsing to the singleton d as n ↑ ∞. In this case, convergence of limiting prices is trivial since p n an (q n ) → d for all sequences {q n }. The second way in which Assumption 4.1 may fail is if there is no consistency between markets in that there is no pricep = d such thatp ∈ I n for all n large. Here, we do not have optimizers (along a subsequence)q n .
Under Assumption 4.1, we present the first main result, which says that optimal positions are becoming large at a rate which grows at least like ℓr n for some ℓ = 0. 
The problem of obtaining upper bounds for lim sup n↑∞ |q n (p n )|/r n is more subtle. First of all we need to identify the maximal range where p n an (ℓr n ) converges. To do this, set (4.6)
As discussed in Section 3.1, p n an (q) is decreasing in q and hence p ∞ (ℓ) is decreasing in ℓ. Therefore, the limits
≤B, however, as the example in Section 4.2 below shows, each of these inequalities may be strict. In particular, the range of limiting indifference prices along the rate r n may deviate from the arbitrage free prices.
With this notation, we now provide the corresponding upper bounds for optimal positions. For I n ∋p n →p we have
Note the strict inequality above implies, for example, that when δ + = ∞ we have lim sup n↑∞qn (p n )/r n < ∞. Lastly, let us discuss when one actually has true convergence. As seen in Section 3.1 the map ℓ → ℓp ∞ (ℓ) is concave. Here, we strengthen this by assuming:
Then, we have the following Corollary which ensures the limitq n /r n actually exists: 
The proofs of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 and of Corollary 4.6 are in Appendix B.
4.2.
Discussion. Presently, we point out some conclusions and subtleties associated to the above results.
First, when we put together Theorems 4.3, 4.4 we see that if the pricep n ∈ I n converges top where
by Corollary 4.6 becomes true convergence if ℓ → ℓp ∞ (ℓ) is strictly concave. Note also that by (3.7), under optimal positions we have convergence of indifference prices as well, i.e. p n an (q n (p n )) → p ∞ (ℓ). Second, assume for example that δ + = ∞. Then, another straightforward calculation shows (recall (4.5))
provided of course such ap exists. This offers a converse to Theorem 4.4.
Third, let us briefly discuss the degenerate case where r n is (chosen) such that p ∞ (ℓ) = d for all ℓ ∈ (δ − , δ + ). In this case, a range of different phenomena can occur. For illustration purposes, we consider the following example, taken from [34] . In the n th market, the claim decomposes into a replicable piece D n (with replicating capital d n ) and a piece Y n which is independent of S n . Now, assume Y n ∼ N (0, γ n ) under P and fix the risk aversion a n ≡ a. Here, the indifference price is
The range of arbitrage free prices is maximal: i.e. B n = −∞,B n = ∞. Forp n ∈ R the optimal purchase quantity found by minimizing qp n − qp n a (q) iŝ
So, both Theorems 4.3, 4.4 hold. Now, change r n so that r n = γ −1 n → ∞. Then, Assumption 3.3 still holds with p ∞ (ℓ) = d, δ − = −∞ and δ + = ∞. In this instance, however, the map ℓp ∞ (ℓ) = ℓd is not strictly concave. Here, ifp n →p ∈ R (which is still arbitrage free since this property does not depend upon r n ) we havê The above example is related to the well known fact from Large Deviations that a LDP may hold for the same sequence of random variables with two different rates {r n } , {r ′ n } with r n /r ′ n → 0. The resulting rate functions however, in an analogous manner to the resultant limiting indifference prices above, may provide drastically different levels of information.
4.3.
On the Normalized Optimal Wealth Process. For a given n, fixed risk aversion a and position size q n , recall the optimal wealth processX n a (q n ) from Section 2. Heuristically, as |q n | → ∞ one expectŝ X n a (q n ), as well as the optimal strategyπ n a (q n ), to grow on the order of |q n |. However, if we normalize the wealth process by the position size then it is reasonable to ask if some type of convergence takes place. To this end we define the normalized wealth processX via
Note thatX n a (q n ) is in fact a wealth process, obtained from the (acceptable) normalized optimal trading strategyπ n a (q n ) = (1/q n )π n a (q n ). We wish to stress that convergence of the normalized optimal wealth process is a topic on its own and we do not study it in this paper. However, we mention some interesting and motivating straightforward conclusions.
Let us come back to (2.6), re-written here as −au n a (0)e −aqnp n a (qn) = E e −qna(X n a (qn) T +B) . Since −au n a (0) ≤ 1 we immediately see that
By Markov's inequality we have the elementary estimate:
Thus, we see that for any q n ↑ ∞ the portfolio obtained by buying one unit of B for p n a (q n ) and trading according to the normalized optimal trading strategy provides a super-hedge of 0 in P−probability in that for all γ > 0
and in fact, the convergence to 0 is exponentially fast. This result essentially follows because of risk aversion and is valid under the minimal Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. If we consider optimal positions then one can say more and characterize the super-hedge more precisely. We first adapt the set-up of [30] and enforce the following assumptions on the claim B and filtration F:
Assumption 4.8. The filtration F is continuous.
Under Assumptions 4.7, 4.8, Theorem 13 of [30] , says that for any q n (4.12)
whereL n a (q n ) is a Q n 0 martingale strongly orthogonal to S n under Q n 0 . Dividing by q n and settingL n a (q n ) = (1/q n )L n a (q n ) as the normalized orthogonal Q n 0 martingale we obtain
Lastly, to evaluate (1/q n )X n a (0) T as q n → ∞ we impose the following mild asymptotic no arbitrage condition (see [33, pp. 9] ):
Assumption 4.9 implies (1/q n )X n a (0) T goes to 0 in Q n 0 probability as q n → ∞. Indeed, using the first order relation in (2.5) a straight-forward calculation shows that for any ε, q n > 0 that
, from which the statement immediately follows. With these preparations, now consider when, additionally, Assumptions 3.3 and 4.1 hold, and positions are taking optimally: i.e. q n =q n =q n (p n ) where
Then, from Theorems 4.3, 4.4 we have up to subsequences (or, under the Assumptions of Corollary 4.6, for all subsequences) thatq n /r n → ℓ ∈ (δ − , δ + ) \ {0} and that p n a (q n ) → p ∞ (ℓ). Thus, we obtain that in Q n 0 -probability
which implies that the excess hedge is precisely aq n L n a (q n ) T /2 in Q n 0 −probability limit as n → ∞. Even though this result is interesting, one would like to have the same statement under the P measure. This is true if the measure P is contiguous with respect to the measure Q n 0 , i.e. that Q n 0 (A n ) → 0 implies P(A n ) → 0 for every sequence of measurable sets {A n } n∈N , e.g. Chapter 6 of [39] . The classical Le Cam's first lemma (Lemma 6.4 in [39] ) provides sufficient and necessary conditions for contiguity.
Lastly, assume that q n = q is fixed and come back to (4.13). Taking expectations yields
where we recall that
0 probability as n → ∞. Therefore, for fixed position sizes, we have in view of (4.13), thatX n a (q) T − (1/q)X n a (0) T +B −d goes to zero in Q n 0 probability and hence, under the additional contiguity assumption, the claim is asymptotically hedgeable. This makes precise the connection between Assumption 3.3 and vanishing hedging errors mentioned in Section 3.1.2.
4.4.
On a Characterization of r n . As in the previous section, we let Assumptions 2.2, 3.3, 4.7 and 4.8
hold. Using the results of [30] , we give a characterization for r n which in a sense justifies the interpretation of r n as the speed at which the market becomes complete. Recalling (3.5), (4.12) and the normalized orthogonal martingaleL n a (q n ) we get
Now, let q n = ℓr n for some |ℓ| < δ (which, by Corollary 4.6 and (3.7) essentially includes the case of optimal positions). We thus have
This conforms to the "asymptotically complete" case. The normalized hedging error under optimal
The speed at which it goes to 0 thus becomes r −1 n and at this scaling we have convergence of prices. In Sections 6 and 7 we study a number of examples where r n can be computed explicitly. One would like to have an abstract formula that explicitly characterizes r n , as (4.15) contains r n within the normalized hedging error L n a (ℓr n ) . Notice that (4.15) holds for all |ℓ| < δ. So, one is tempted to take limits as ℓ → 0 on both sides, and, if one can interchange the n ↑ ∞ limit with the ℓ → 0 limit, pass the latter limit inside the expectation, and if p ∞ (ℓ) is both strictly decreasing and differentiable at ℓ = 0, then for n large enough
Here, the interpretation of r −1 n as a market incompleteness factor is much more transparent. Indeed, defině X n ,Ľ n through the Kunita-Watanabe decomposition of −B with respect to the subspace of L 2 (Q n 0 ; F T ) generated by trading in S n so that
In other words,L n a (0) describes the hedging error associated to B, with size E Q n 0 L n a (0) T ∝ r −1 n . Thus r −1 n acts as the market incompleteness factor, and, as the market becomes complete, we see that r n → ∞.
The derivation of this statement is of course heuristic. Rigorous proof of this result seems to be quite hard, but we nevertheless present the argument as it provides more intuition into the problem. We choose to leave the rigorous derivation of this result and further consequences as a future interesting work.
Optimal Position Taking for General Utilities.
The optimal position taking results in Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 readily extend to general utility functions on the real line. This essentially follows from [33] .
Throughout this section we fix the risk aversion at a > 0. Define U a as the class of utility functions on R (i.e. U ∈ C 2 (R), strictly increasing and strictly concave) satisfying
• The absolute risk aversion of U is bounded between two positive constants: i.e. for 0 < a U <ā U :
• U decays exponentially with rate a for large negative wealths: i.e.
(4.17) lim
By (4.16) it follows that U is bounded from above on R and hence through a normalization we assume 0 = U (∞) = lim x↑∞ U (x). From [33, Section 2.2] it holds that U ∈ U a satisfies both the Inada con-
Similarly to (2.2) and (2.3), define the value function in the n th market with initial capital x and q units of the claim as u n U (x, q), where if q = 0 we write u n U (x). Analogously to (2.4), set p n U (x, q) as the (average, bid) utility indifference price defined through the equation
So that p n U (x, q) is well defined for x, q ∈ R we assume the claim is bounded: i.e. we enforce Assumption 4.7. Under Assumptions 2.2, 4.7 it follows from [32] that for x, q ∈ R, p n U (x, q) is well defined, arbitrage free, decreasing in q with limits (recall (4.2)) lim q↓−∞ p n (x, q) =B n , lim q↑∞ p n (x, q) = B n , for each n.
To connect limiting prices for U with those for the exponential utility we additionally enforce the asymptotic no arbitrage condition in Assumption 4.9, and recall that using [33, Theorem 3.3] , it follows from Assumptions 2.2, 3.3, 4.7 and 4.9 that for all x ∈ R and 0 < |ℓ| < δ:
As for ℓ = 0, since Assumption 3.3 implies p ∞ is continuous at 0, the monotonicity of p n U (x, q) yields for 0 < ℓ < δ that
so that taking ℓ ↓ 0 we obtain that p n U (x, 0) → p ∞ (0). Now, for a given arbitrage free pricep n ∈ I n , we consider the optimal purchase problem
Unlike for the exponential case when the results of [24] yield a unique maximizer, here, to the best our our knowledge, there are no known results on existence/uniqueness of optimizers (see [36] for results with utility functions defined on the positive axis). However, the main results of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 still hold, as the following theorem shows. • For each n there exists an optimizerq n =q n (x,p n ) to (4.20).
• If p ∞ (δ + ) <p < d then for any sequence of maximizers {q n }:
• If d <p < p ∞ (δ − ) then for any sequence of maximizers {q n }:
Remark 4.11. As with the exponential case, a sufficient condition for the limits to exist in (4.21) and (4.22) is Assumption 4.5.
ON PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM PRICE QUANTITY AND ITS LIMITING BEHAVIOR
The concept of indifference pricing has a subjective nature, in the sense that the indifference price of an investor is a way she values unhedgeable positions, and whether or not there is a counter-party to offset a transaction is a different question. In particular, so far we have assumed that a sequence of pricesp n ∈ I n converges top, without mentioning whether such prices equilibrate any transactions among different investors. In this section, we address this issue and we justify that such sequence of prices could indeed be the equilibrium prices of the given claim B among (two) investors.
For this, we adapt the notion of the partial equilibrium price quantity (PEPQ). Provided that the stock dynamics are exogenously specified, the equilibrium price of a claim B is the one at which the investors' optimal quantities of the claim sum up to zero, meaning that the market of the claim is cleared out (the word partial refers to the fact the investors specify the equilibrium of the claim and not the stock market).
Essentially, the main motivation of this section is to study under Assumption 3.3 when our main optimal position taking results could arise in an equilibrium setting whether all investors act optimally and the price p n is the equilibrium price in the n th market of a given claim B. In short, the analysis of this section prove that if the investors' risky exposures (random endowments) are dominated by r n , thenp n → d. However, if investors' endowments are growing like r n , equilibrium pricesp n could converge to a limit different than d and the results of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 occur. The latter situation, which happens when at least one investor has an already undertaken large position in B, means that there are cases where the large regime is in fact the market's equilibrium, and even more interestingly the equilibrium prices converge to a price different than the unique limiting arbitrage free price.
In the setting of a locally bounded semi-martingale stock market, bounded claims, and exponential utility maximizers, the PEPQ is analyzed in [1] . Specified to the current setup of Section 2, we assume, for each n, there is a group of I investors such that each investor i is endowed with a exogenously given random endowment, denoted by E i n . For a given bounded claim B, the investors also wish to trade B amongst themselves in such a way that acting optimally (in terms of utility maximization) the market for the claim clears.
For simplicity, we consider the presence of two investors, although we should point out that the results of this section can be generalized for markets with more investors. Recall that I n from (4.2) denotes the (non-empty) range of arbitrage free prices for B and let a i n > 0 denote the risk aversion coefficient for investor i. Before we give the exact definition of the PEPQ for a claim B, we need to introduce the notation for the indirect utility and the indifference pricing under the presence of random endowment. Namely, for the random endowment E i n and position size q in B, define, in a similar manner to (2.2), the value function for investor i by
Similarly to (2.4), the average (bid) indifference price of the investor i with random endowment E n i at the n th market is denoted by p n a i n (q|E i n ) and is given as the solution of
Note that the indifference price's independence on the (constant) initial wealth still holds under the presence of the random endowment, which means that we can again assume x = 0. Next, for a given p n ∈ I n , consider the optimal purchase quantity problem for investor i defined by identifying (compare with (4.3)):
As shown in Proposition 5.5 in [1] , the optimization problem (5.3) admits a representation similar to the corresponding problem without random endowment (see (B.1)). Namely, we have that
A PEPQ is then defined as a pair (p n * , q n * ) ∈ I n × R such that
In other words, at price p n * it is optimal for investor 1 to buy q n * and investor 2 to sell q n * units of B, thus the market clears out. Taking representation (5.4) into account, it is then a matter of simple calculations to get the following condition for the PEPQ for each n (see also Proposition 5.6 and Corollary 5.7 in [1] ):
The equilibrium price p n * is then given by
where Q n i (q) denotes the dual optimizer inM n for the position qB +E n i and risk aversion a i n (recall the first order condition (4.4) without random endowment)
† . According to Theorem 5.8 in [1] , for a non-replicable bounded claim B (i.e. satisfying Assumption 4.7) a PEPQ (p n * , q n * ) ∈ I n × R always exists for each n ∈ N, and it is unique with q n * = 0 if and only if 
For the proofs of this section we need to introduce the notion of the (bid) indifference price for every arbitrary bounded payoff C ∈ L ∞ under risk aversion a n > 0 in the n th market, denoted by P n an (C) and defined as the solution of the following equation
Note that under this notation qp n an (q) = P n an (qB), for all q ∈ R with p n an defined in ( 
For this, we note that the indifference price of an exponential utility maximizer under some random endowment can be written as the difference of two indifference prices without endowments (see among others, Appendix of [1] and recall definition (5.7)):
Hence, for any |ℓ|
where the limiting argument follows by the imposed assumptions on function p n a i n and E n i . We similarly show that p n Returning to the PEPQ, we exclude trivial cases for each n ∈ N by imposing the following assumption.
Assumption 5.2. For each n, E n i ∈ L ∞ for both i = 1, 2 and a 1 n E n 1 − a 2 n E n 2 is non-replicable.
As mentioned above, this assumption guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of the PEPQ (p n * , q n * ) for each n with q n * = 0. Imposing Assumption 3.3 for indifference prices of both investors, we first address the conditions that give the convergence of the equilibrium prices to d. Proof. Let p n * denote an arbitrarily chosen convergent subsequence of the equilibrium prices of B with limit p (note that B ∈ L ∞ guarantees the existence of such subsequence) and assume thatp = d, and in particular
Under Assumptions 4.7 and 5.2, it follows by Theorem 5.1 of [24] that the map q → qp n a i n (q|E n i ) is strictly concave for each i = 1, 2, and also that
holds due to Assumption 5.2. Thus, first assume for some subsequence
, for sufficiently large n. Then q n * > 0 and in fact E Q n
. In view of Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 5.1, we have that the inequalityp < d implies the existence of a further subsequence of q n * (still labeled n) such that lim n→∞ q n * /r 1 n = ℓ > 0. We reach then a contradiction if we show that for sufficiently large n, the position −q n * is not optimal for investor 2. Sincep < d, we get from Assumption 3.3 that there exists c > 0 such that for any sufficiently large n,
where the first inequality holds because the position −q n * is optimal for investor 2 at price p n * , for each n. Using the relation (5.8) and the representation (2.7) we get that (recall definition (5.2))
, for sufficiently large n, then q n * < 0 and up to a subsequence q n * /r 2 n → −ℓ < 0. In this case, we follow the same arguments to show that the position −q n * could not be optimal for the investor 1 for sufficiently large n. Finally, the case wherep > d is symmetric to the analysis above and hence omitted.
Withdrawing however the assumption ||E n i || L ∞ /r n → 0 could give the interesting cases where the equilibrium prices converge to a price different than the unique arbitrage free price of the limiting market and the i. For each market n ∈ N, the unique PEPQ pair (p n * , q n * ) is given by
, with 1/a := 1/a 1 + 1/a 2 and b n := b n 1 + b n 2 . ii. Letting for each n ∈ N, b n 2 = κr n , for some κ ∈ (0, δ + /a) and b n 1 = b 1 ∈ R, we get that lim n→∞ q n * /r n = ℓ > 0 and p n * →p < d.
Proof. The proof of the first item i. is based on standard arguments of the related literature (see for example Theorem 3.2 in [5] ). We recall that the equilibrium quantity is the solution of the optimization problem (5.5) and thanks to the strict concavity of the function q → qp n a i (q|E n i ) we get that for any q ∈ R and every n ∈ N,
We then observe that in fact b n p n a (b n ) = q n * p n a 1 (q n * |E n 1 ) + p n a 2 (−q n * |E n 2 ) , which means that q n * is indeed the equilibrium quantity. The fact that equilibrium price p n * equals to E Q −ab n [B] readily follows by (5.6).
For the second item, we have that q * n /r n = (a 2 κr n −
is the equilibrium price for each n, we have that p n * < p n 1 (q n * |E n 1 ), since q n * is optimal position for investor 1 at price p n * . Then by using the representation (5.8) as in the proof of Lemma 5.1, we get that
Recall that p n * = E Q −ab n [B] and note that strict concavity of the function q → qp n a 1 (q|E n 1 ) and equation (5.9) give that p n * is decreasing in n and hence it has a limiting pointp. Thus, we have that lim n→∞ p * n = p ≤ p ∞ (aκ) < p ∞ (0) = d, where the last strict inequality follows by Assumption 4.5.
Proposition 5.4 indicates that there are cases where the equilibrium quantity increases to infinity at the same time where the equilibrium price is different than the limiting arbitrage free price. It is important to point out here that both investors act optimally at that equilibrium prices even though the limiting price is different than d. The essential element is of course that one of the investor is endowed with a large position on the claim and she is willing to sell portion of her position at a price which induces the other investor acting optimally to enter to a large claim regime too. In other words, Proposition 5.4 justifies the large volume of some OTC derivative markets and the corresponding extreme prices as long as some of the participants in the market are already exposed to a risk that is highly correlated with the payoff of the tradeable derivatives. This situation fits to the observed extreme volumes and prices for example in the Mortgage Backed Securities market in the recent years.
Remark 5.5. The proof of Proposition 5.4 can easily be generalized in the case where the endowments are of the form E n i = b n i B + E n i , with the choices of b n i as in the Proposition 5.4 and E n i being bounded random endowments such that ||E n i || L ∞ /r n → 0.
EXAMPLES WHERE THE LIMITING SCALED INDIFFERENCE PRICE EXIST
The power of Assumption 3.3 is its validity in a wide variety of models. In this section we give four well studied market model examples. Then, in the next section we pay particular attention to an example with transactions costs. Remarkably, even though the standard duality results no longer apply, a version of Assumption 3.3 still holds and more importantly, so do the conclusions of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4.
Vanishing Risk Aversion in a Fixed
Market. As shown Section 3.1.1 for a fixed market, if the risk aversion vanishes (i.e. a n → 0) then Assumption 3.3 holds with r n = a −1 n and p ∞ (ℓ) = p 1 (ℓ). In addition, as the class of acceptable trading strategies A is a cone it follows for any q n thatπ an (q n ) = (1/a n )π 1 (a n q n ). So, for q n = ℓr n = ℓ/a n , not only do indifference prices trivially converge, but the optimal trading strategy is explicitly known, i.e. it is (1/a n )π 1 (ℓ) = r nπ1 (ℓ) = (q n /ℓ)π 1 (ℓ). Note that in this instance the normalized optimal trading strategy trivially converges but does not necessarily provide a super hedge. [12, 21, 33, 38] amongst others. Here, we have for each n one risky asset S n which evolves according to
Basis Risk Model with High Correlation. This example is considered in detail in
where W andW are two independent Brownian motions. The filtered probability space is the standard two-dimensional augmented Wiener space. The coefficients a, b have appropriate regularity and are such that Y has a unique strong solution taking values in an open subset E of R. Set λ := µ/σ as the market price of risk and assume that σ 2 (y) > 0, y ∈ E and that λ is bounded on E. B = B(Y T ) for some continuous bounded function B on E. As shown in [33, Section 5.3], B n = B = inf y∈E B(y) and B n =B = sup y∈E B(y) for all n. Set r n = (1 − ρ 2 n ) −1 . As shown in [38] (see also [33] ), for a fixed risk aversion a > 0 and ℓ ∈ R, ℓ = 0:
For ℓ = 0 one has
Thus, if ρ n → 1 (limit of high correlation) then r n → ∞ and
where Q is the unique martingale measure in the ρ = 1 market where the filtration is restricted to F W .
Furthermore, using l'Hopital's rule one obtains , assumed positive definite so that for some λ > 0 and all ξ = (ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ...) with
The claim (as is typical in life insurance markets) is given as the sum of independent, F W i adapted
To make B well defined and amenable to large claim analysis we assume E e λB i < ∞, i = 1, 2, ... and
For n = 1, 2, ... we construct the n th market by restricting trading to the first n assets. Thus, as n ↑ ∞ the claim is asymptotically hedgeable, though for each n the market is incomplete. As shown in [34] ,
where Q 0 is the unique martingale measure in the limiting complete market.
log E e λB i < ∞ for all λ ∈ R, we know that lim n↑∞ E Y 2 n = 0. Assume furthermore that Y n is converging to 0 sufficiently fast so that it satisfies a LDP with scaling r n → ∞ and good rate function I such that {I = 0} = {0}. Lastly, assume that for some δ > 0, |λ| < δ implies
For example, this will hold if
Fix the risk aversion a n = a > 0. As shown in [34] , at ℓ = 0 we have
Additionally, as can be deduced from I(y) = 0 ↔ y = 0, (6.1) and the lower-semicontinuity of I, it follows
Thus, Assumption 3.3 holds. Lastly, it is also shown in [34] that for all q ∈ R the normalized residual risk processŶ n a (q) of (2.10) is precisely Y n and, as such, does not depend upon q.
Black-Scholes-Merton Model with Vanishing Default Probability.
This example is taken from [25] and the setup is similar to that considered in [29] . Here, we consider the Black-Scholes-Merton model, except that the stock may default at the first jump time of an independent Poisson process. The claim is a defaultable bond paying 1 if the stock has not defaulted by time T . The owner of the bond wishes to hedge the claim by trading in S n , but needs to take into account the event of default, since the stock is stuck at 0 after default occurs.
Fix n and let λ n > 0. For each n, the probability space is assumed to support a Brownian motion W as well as an independent Poisson process N n with intensity λ n . Denote byÑ n the compensated Poisson process so thatÑ n t = N n t − λ n (τ n ∧ t), where τ n = inf {t ≥ 0 : N n = 1}. The filtration is that generated by N n and W , augmented so that it satisfies the usual conditions. The (single) risky asset S n evolves according to
The claim is a defaultable bond which pays 1 if S n defaults before T : i.e. B = 1 τ n ≤T ‡
. Here, B n = 0 and B n = 1, this is because we can equivalently change the default intensity to take any positive value. Thus, Assumption 4.1 holds even though d = 1 and hence d ∈ I n for all n.
As shown in [25] , u n a (0, q) = − 1 a F n (0; q) where F n (·; q) solves the ODĖ
It is easy to see that the optimalφ n in the above minimization satisfiesφ n (t; q)eφ n (t;q) = λ n (F n (t; q)) −1 e µ σ 2 , where one can show that F n (t; q) > 0. Now, let λ n ↓ 0 (vanishing default probabilities) and set r n = − log(λ n ). With q n = ℓr n , one can show that for ℓ < 1/a:
we see that Assumption 3.3 is satisfied, though the map ℓ → ℓp ∞ (ℓ) = ℓ is not strictly concave.
VANISHING TRANSACTION COSTS IN THE BLACK-SCHOLES-MERTON MODEL
In this section we show that the existence of limiting indifference prices and the resultant statements about optimal position taking even extend to models with frictions, where the standard duality results used in Section 2 are not as fully developed (see [11] for a recent treatment of the topic). As such, this example is given its own section. ‡ As the claim depends upon n here it does not fit precisely into the setup of Section 2. However, as inspection of the Propositions in Appendix A shows, the results of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 readily extend to a sequence of claims Bn if they are uniformly bounded.
We consider the Black-Scholes-Merton model with proportional transactions costs, as studied in [4, 6, 10, 13, 20, 23, 27, 28, 35] amongst many others. We take the approach of [10] and especially [4, 23] . Using the notation of [4] , the stock S evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion
Here, the filtered probability space is the standard one-dimensional Wiener space. Now, fix a time t ≤ T and s > 0 and assume S t = s. Denote by X and Y respectively the processes of dollar holdings in the money market and shares of stock owned associated to a trading strategy L, M where
and L represents the cumulative transfers (in shares of stock) from the money market to the stock and M represents the cumulative transfers from the stock to the money market. We denote by A t the set of (L, M )
where L, M are adapted, non-decreasing and left-continuous with L t = M t = 0. There is a proportional transaction cost λ ∈ (0, 1) by trading. In other words, for a given initial position (x, y) where x ∈ R is the initial capital and y ∈ R the initial shares held in S the corresponding processes evolve according to
( 7.2)
The claim B is a European call option on S: i.e. B = (S T − K) + , and suppose that the investor is considering selling the call. For an exponential investor with fixed risk aversion a > 0 the value function without the claim is given by
Here, E s,t [·] refers to conditioning on time t given S t = s. The value function for q units of the call is
The indifference price p a (x, y, q; s, t, λ) is then defined through the balance equation (7.5) u a (x + qp a (x, y, q; s, t, λ), y, q; s, t, λ) = u a (x, y; s, t, λ).
Remark 7.1. p a (x, y, q; s, t, λ) is thus the average ask indifference price, as opposed to the average bid indifference price defined in Section 2. However, using the arguments of Section 2 and definition (5.7) for a general claim B, the bid and ask prices are related by p ask a (q; B) = −p bid a (q; −B), where p bid a (q; B) denotes the average bid price (1/q)P bid a (qB).
Though the results in [4] are stated in the joint limit of vanishing transactions costs (i.e. λ n → 0) and infinite risk aversion (i.e. a = a n → ∞), they easily (as the authors therein mention) translate into asymptotics in the joint limit that λ n → 0 and q = q n → ∞ for a fixed risk aversion a. This translation is made precise in the following proposition.
Proposition 7.2.
Fix s > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , x ∈ R, y ∈ R, λ ∈ (0, 1) and a > 0. The (ask) indifference price p a is independent of x and hence write p a = p a (y, q; s, t, λ). Now, let λ n → 0 and set r n := λ −2 n . For ℓ > 0 and q n = ℓr n = ℓλ −2 n we have for all y n such that lim n↑∞ λ 3 n |y n | = 0:
is the unique continuous viscosity solution to the non-linear
Black-Scholes PDE
(7.6)
Remark 7.3. The above result allows for y n to vary since intuitively a position size of q n in the call would be associated to an initial position of q n y in the stock for some y ∈ R. Note that for y n = q n y = ℓyλ −2 n we have λ 3 n |y n | → 0.
To obtain the optimal position taking results analogous to Theorems 4.3, 4.4, it is first necessary to identify the range of limiting prices p ∞ a (ℓ; s, t) in Proposition 7.2 as ℓ varies between 0 and ∞. In other words, we must consider asymptotics for Ψ(; b) for small and large b.
As b ↓ 0, Theorem 7.4 below proves continuity in that Ψ(s, t; b) → Ψ(s, t; 0). But, for b = 0, (7.6) is just the regular Black-Scholes PDE which admits a unique (explicit) classical solution. Thus, as ℓ ↓ 0, the limiting indifference price converges to the unique price in complete, λ n = 0 market given S t = s. 
Remark 7.6. An inspection of the proof of Theorem 7.4 below shows that Ψ(s, t; b) is continuously increasing in b. Thus, if q n = ℓ n r n where ℓ n → ℓ ≥ 0 then the indifference prices converge to Ψ(s, t; √ aℓ).
With the above asymptotics for p ∞ a (ℓ; s, t) in place, we now consider the optimal sale quantity problem in the n th market with transactions cost λ n . In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that given S t = s the investor has the opportunity to sell call options at a pricep n in the n th market. To finance this sale, the investor cashes out her initial position in the stock, receiving ys(1 − λ n ) for the sale of y shares. Then, with x + ys(1 − λ n ) in cash, she identifies the optimal number of options to sell by solving the problem
In the frictionless case, ifp n is arbitrage free in the n th market, then (see [24] ), an optimalq n exists and is unique. When considering transactions costs, rather than identifying the arbitrage free prices in each market, we use the small and large ℓ asymptotics for p ∞ a (ℓ; s, t) obtained in Theorems 7.4, 7.5 to identify a maximal range of reasonable pricesp n for which one can sell the option. Indeed, from the above theorems
It is well known that Ψ(s, t; 0) < s. Furthermore, if one is going to sell options, the effect of the transactions costs is that the ask price should a) be at least as large as Ψ(s, t; 0) and b) be no higher than p since no-one would buy at this price § . Thus, the only range of reasonable prices to sell at is (Ψ(s, t; 0), s). With this motivation we have:
Theorem 7.7. Letp n ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s) for each n withp n →p wherep ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s). Let λ n → 0. For each n there exists a maximizerq n > 0 to (7.8) . Additionally, for any sequence {q n } n∈N of maximizers:
Thus, up to subsequences,q n /r n → ℓ and hence for any sequence {y n } n∈N such that λ 3 n |y n | → 0:
APPENDIX A. TECHNICAL SUPPORTING RESULTS
The following propositions provide the main technical tools to prove the optimal position taking results in both the frictionless and transactions cost cases. To seamlessly integrate with the transaction costs case, results are separated into long and short positions. § Technically: no one would buy at a price at or above p(1 + λn) because it would then be preferable to buy the stock and not trade. For this to hold as λn ↓ 0, we requirep n ≤ p. Our results are valid forp n < p.
A.1. Long Positions. Assume:
Assumption A.1. {p n } is a family of functions defined on (0, ∞) such that
• For each n, p n is non-increasing and continuous.
• There exists a γ > 0 such that lim sup n↑∞ sup q≤γ q|p n (q)| = C(γ) < ∞.
• There exists r n → ∞ and δ > 0 such that for 0 < ℓ < δ we have lim n↑∞ p n (ℓr n ) = p ∞ (ℓ).
• With p ∞ + (0) := lim ℓ↓0 p ∞ (ℓ) and p n (∞) := lim q↑∞ p n (q) we have lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) < p ∞ + (0).
To find the maximal upper bound of convergence, set
. As such, a sufficient condition for bullet point four in Assumption A.1 to hold is that p ∞ (ℓ) < p ∞ + (0) for some 0 < ℓ < δ + .
Under Assumption A.1 we have the following result for positive position sizes:
• If lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) <p < p ∞ + (0) then for n large enough the optimization problem
admits a minimizerq n > 0.
• If lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) <p < p ∞ + (0) then for any sequence of minimizers {q n }:
• If additionally lim ℓ↑δ + p ∞ (ℓ) <p < p ∞ + (0) then for any sequence {q n } of minimizers:
Proof of Proposition A.2. First consider the minimization problem in (A.2). Sincep n →p there is some ε > 0 and N ε so that n ≥ N ε implies lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) + ε <p n < p ∞ + (0) − ε. Next, choose ℓ > 0 small enough so thatp n < p ∞ (ℓ) − ε/2. By enlarging N ε we know for n ≥ N ε that p n (∞) ≤ lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) + ε/2 and p ∞ (ℓ) < p n (ℓr n ) + ε/4 and hence
For a fixed n, note that lim q↑∞ (p n − p n (q)) =p n − p n (∞) ≥ ε/2. Thus, if {q m n } m∈N is a minimizing sequence for (A.2), then {q m n } is bounded and hence has an accumulation pointq n . We now show that q n = 0, which combined with the continuity of qp n (q) provesq n > 0 is a minimizer. To see thatq n = 0 we use a contradiction argument. Note that with the γ from Assumption A.1:
For the given ε, by enlarging N ε we may assume that for n ≥ N ε lim inf
But, for the ℓ from (A.5):
(A.6) ℓr np n − ℓr n p n (ℓr n ) ≤ −ℓr n ε/4.
Combining the last two displays we get that for the chosen n, we have
However, by potentially enlarging N ε , and since r n → ∞, we can always arrange things so that −ℓr n ε/4 < −C(γ) − ε. This leads to a contradiction, proving thatq n = 0. Now, let {q n } be a sequence of minimizers. We first claim that lim inf n↑∞qn > 0. Indeed, assume there is a subsequence (still labeled n) so that lim n↑∞qn = 0. We then have, using the γ of Assumption A.1 that
But, this directly violates the minimality ofq n in view of (A.6). As such, there is some K > 0 so that q n ≥ K for n large enough. Now, assume that lim inf n↑∞qn /r n = 0 and take a subsequence such that lim n↑∞qn /r n = 0. For all 0 < c < δ + we seep
As n ↑ ∞ we know thatp n −p n (cr n ) →p−p ∞ (c),q n /(cr n ) → 0 andp n →p. Recall that lim inf n↑∞qn ≥ K and the γ from Assumption A.1. Note that if K > γ then
Putting these together gives
Thus, taking n ↑ ∞ in (A.7) givesp ≥ p ∞ (c). Taking c ↓ 0 givesp ≥ p ∞ + (0) a contradiction. Therefore, (A.3) holds.
Next, assume that lim sup n↑∞qn /r n ≥ δ+ and take a subsequence so that lim n↑∞qn /r n = k ≥ δ + .
For each c < δ + we haveq n /r n ≥ c and hence for any K > 0,q n ≥ K for n large enough. Thus, we have
Clearly, Kp n /q n → 0. Additionally, for any 0 < c ′ < δ + :
Thus, dividing byq n in (A.8) and taking n ↑ ∞ yields 0 ≥p − p ∞ (c). Taking c ↑ δ + gives thatp ≤ lim c↑δ + p ∞ (c), which is a contradiction. Therefore, (A.4) holds.
A.2. Short Positions. We just state the result for q < 0 as the proof is the exact same. First, we assume:
Assumption A.3. {p n } is a family of functions defined on (−∞, 0) such that
• There exists a γ < 0 such that lim sup n↑∞ sup q≥γ q|p n (q)| = C(γ) < ∞.
• There exists r n → ∞ and δ > 0 such that for −δ < ℓ < 0 we have lim n↑∞ p n (ℓr n ) = p ∞ (ℓ).
• With p ∞ − (0) := lim ℓ↑0 p ∞ (ℓ) and p n (−∞) :
To find the minimal lower bound of convergence, set
As before, we have for any δ − < ℓ < 0 that p ∞ − (0) ≤ p ∞ (ℓ) ≤ lim inf n↑∞ p n (−∞) so that a sufficient condition for bullet point four above to hold is that p ∞ − (0) < p ∞ (ℓ) for some δ − < ℓ < 0. The main result now reads: Proposition A.4. Let Assumption A.3 hold. Letp n →p.
• If p ∞ − (0) <p < lim inf n↑∞ p n (−∞) then for n large enough the optimization problem
admits a minimizerq n < 0.
• If p ∞ − (0) <p < lim inf n↑∞ p n (−∞) then for any sequence of minimizers {q n }:
• If additionally p ∞ − (0) <p < lim ℓ↓δ − p ∞ (ℓ) then for any sequence {q n } of minimizers:
A.3. Long and Short Positions. We now combine the long and short results of the previous section into one result which will be used to prove the frictionless results of Section 4. Here, we assume Assumption A.5. {p n } n∈N is a sequence of functions on R such that
• There exists a γ > 0 such that lim sup n↑∞ sup |q|≤γ q|p n (q)| = C(γ) < ∞.
• There exists r n → ∞ and δ > 0 such that for |ℓ| < δ we have p n (ℓr n ) → p ∞ (ℓ).
• lim ℓ→0 p ∞ (ℓ) = p ∞ (0). Proposition A.6. Let Assumption A.5 hold and define δ + , δ − as in (A.1) and (A.9). Letp n →p.
• Assume that lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) < p ∞ (0). If lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) <p < p ∞ (0) then for n large enough any minimizer to the optimization problem inf q∈R (qp − qp n (q)) is positive. Furthermore, for any sequence of minimizers {q n } n∈N we have that 0 < lim inf n↑∞qn /r n . If additionally lim ℓ↑δ + p ∞ (ℓ) <p < p ∞ (0) then for any sequence of minimizers {q n } n∈N we have that lim sup n↑∞qn /r n < δ + .
• Assume that p ∞ (0) < lim inf n↑∞ p n (−∞). If p ∞ (0) <p < lim inf n↑∞ p n (−∞) then for n large enough, any minimizer to the optimization problem inf q∈R (qp n − qp n (q)) is negative. Furthermore, for any sequence of minimizers {q n } n∈N we have that 0 < lim inf n↑∞ −q n /r n . If additionally p ∞ (0) <p < lim ℓ↓δ − p ∞ (ℓ) then for any sequence of minimizers {q n } we have that lim sup n↑∞ −q n /r n < −δ − .
Proof of Proposition A.6. We will prove the results for lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) <p < p ∞ (0) and lim ℓ↑∞ p ∞ (ℓ) < p < p ∞ (0) respectively; the proof for the other case is the exact same. First, since p n (0) is well defined for each n, we have 0 ×p n − 0 × p n (0) = 0. Additionally, for ε > 0 so that lim sup n↑∞ p n (∞) + ε <p < p ∞ (0) − ε we have for q < 0 and n large enough that
But, from (A.6) we see there is some ℓ > 0 so that ℓr np n − ℓr n p n (ℓr n ) < 0. Thus it suffices to minimize over q > 0 and hence Proposition A.2 yields a minimizer to the problem over (0, ∞), as well as the asymptotic behaviorq n /r n of minimizersq n given above, finishing the result. Proof of Lemma B.1. As shown in Section 3.1, p n an (q) is decreasing in q and the map q → qp n an (q) is concave and well defined, finite, for all q ∈ R. As such, p n an (q) is continuous on (−∞, 0) and (0, ∞) respectively. But, it is well known that continuity at 0 follows as well and in fact lim q→0 p n an (q) = E Q n 0 [B] = p n an (0) = d n . Thus, bullet point one in Assumption A.5 holds. Regarding bullet point two, let γ > 0. If 0 < q ≤ γ then for any 0 < ℓ < δ + and n sufficiently large so that r n ≥ ℓ/γ:
If −γ ≤ q < 0 then for any δ − < ℓ ′ < 0 and n so that r n ≥ −ℓ ′ /γ:
As such:
and bullet point two holds. Bullet points three and four are Assumption 3.3, finishing the result.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Forp n ∈ I n , the optimal positionq n (p n ) is the unique solution of the problem (4.3).
Using the explicit formula for U an in (2.1) and p n an in (2.6), this optimization problem is equivalent to finding
The results of the theorem will follow from Proposition A.6 once the requisite hypotheses are met where p n (q) = p n an (q). By Lemma B.1, Assumption A.5 holds. Now, letp n ∈ I n ,p n →p wherep andp < d.
Thus, the conclusions of the theorem follow from Proposition A.6. Similarly letp n ∈ I n ,p n →p wherep
Thus, the conclusions of the theorem follow from Proposition A.6 as well, finishing the result.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, it is enough to show that requisite hypotheses of Proposition A.6 are met where p n (q) = p n an (q) and the optimal positionq n (p n ) is given in (B.1). Again by Lemma B.1, we have that Assumption A.5 holds. Now, letp n ∈ I n ,p n →p wherep and p ∞ (δ + ) <p < d.
Proof of Corollary 4.6. Let, for example,p n →p ∈ (p ∞ (δ + ), d) so that
Writeq n forq n (p n ) and assume for some subsequence (still labeled n) thatq n /r n → ℓ ∈ [ℓ,l]. Let τ ∈ [ℓ,l]. By the optimality ofq n q np n −q n p n an (q n ) ≤ τ r np n − τ r n p n an (τ r n ).
Dividing by r n , letting n ↑ ∞ and using Assumption 3.3 with (3.7) one obtains
Since this works for all τ ∈ [ℓ,l], we get that
Hence, we see that the only possible limit points forq n /r n are the minimizers of ℓp
But, under the assumption of strict concavity for ℓp ∞ (ℓ) any minimizer is unique and hence the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.10. We start be proving the first bullet, i.e., that we show that maximizers exist to the optimal purchase quantity problem in (4.20) . To do so we use the following basic result (see [17, Proposition 2 .47]): if U ∈ U a then with α U ,ᾱ U of (4.16) it holds for U a from (2.1) with a n ≡ a that
and where F,F are concave and increasing. Thus, by Jensen's inequality, for any set of random variables
Since for any a > 0, u n a (x −p n q, q) = e −a(x−p n q) u n a (0, q) , we obtain from (2.6) that
and hence from the second inequality in (B.2) and lim x↓−∞ U (x) = −∞ (which follows from (4.17)) we
As U (x −p n q − |q| B L ∞ ) ≤ u n U (x −p n q, q) ≤ 0, any maximizing sequence {q n m } m∈N must be bounded and has an accumulation pointq n . Now, u n U (x −p n q, q) admits the variational representation (see [32] )
Thus, we see that q → u n U (x −p n q, q) is concave, hence continuous on R andq n is indeed a maximizer. We next show for p ∞ (δ + ) <p < d and I n ∋p n →p that (4.21) holds (the corresponding proof for negative positions in (4.22) is omitted as it is the exact same). We first claim that for n large enough, any maximizerq n is positive. Indeed, since d n → d where d n = E Q n 0 [B] = p n a (0) (for any a > 0) andp < d, p n →p we can find n large enough so thatp n < d n . Thus, for q < 0 we have (since p n a (q) is decreasing in q for any a > 0) that
In view of (B.2) this implies for q ≤ 0 that
Now, let ℓ > 0 be so that ℓā U /a < δ + . At q = ℓr n we have
Sincep < p ∞ (0) and p ∞ is continuous at 0 we can find an ℓ small enough so the above quantity is strictly positive for n large. Thus, from (B.2) we see that
As n ↑ ∞ the right hand side above converges to 0 whereas the right hand side of (B.5), in view of Assumption 4.9 is bounded above by U (C + x) < 0 for some constant C. Thus, for large enough n, no maximizer can be non-positive. Now, let {q n } n∈N be a sequence of (positive) maximizers. We prove the lower bound in (4.21) by contradiction; i.e. assume lim inf n↑∞qn /r n = 0 and take a sequence (still labeled n) whereq n /r n → 0.
Let 0 < ℓ < δ +ā U /a and assumeq n /r n ≤ ℓ. Sinceq n was an optimizer, we obtain from (B.2) that
Since ℓr n > 0
For any a > 0, −(1/a) ≤ u n a (0) = −(1/a)e −H(Q n 0 | P) . Additionally, from (2.7) it holds for any a, b > 0 that p n a (q) = p n b (aq/b). Thus by Assumptions 3.3 and 4.9
where the last equality follows sinceq n /r n → 0,p n →p and |p n
To obtain the upper bound in (4.21), we first claim that
Assuming (B.6) the upper bound in (4.21) readily follows: indeed, assume lim sup n↑∞qn /r n = k ≥ δ + and take a subsequence (still labeled n) so thatq n /r n → k. Let 0 < ℓ < δ + so thatq n /r n ≥ ℓ for n large enough. Since p n U (x, q) is decreasing in q, (B.6) impliesp n ≤ p n U (x, ℓr n ). Taking n ↑ ∞ givesp ≤ p ∞ (ℓ) and then taking ℓ ↑ δ + givesp ≤ p ∞ (δ + ). But, this is a contradiction and hence (4.21) holds.
To prove (B.6), come back to (B.3). Write Z Q,n := dQ n 0 /dP| F T . From (B.3) it follows for any y > 0 that
Consider the problem
According to [33, Lemma A.4 ] the map y → E V (yZ Q,n ) is differentiable with derivative E Z Q,n V ′ (yZ Q,n ) .
Thus, we see the derivative of the above map is
where the last equality follows since
Since U ∈ U a and Assumption 4.9 imply u n U (x) < 0, the strict convexity of V yields a unique y Q,n solving (B.8) and this y satisfies the first order condition
A straightforward calculation shows τ V ′′ (τ ) = 1/α U (I(τ )) where
We have already shown the existence of aq n > 0 which maximizes u n U (x −p n q, q) and shown that for n large enough u n (x −pq n ,q n ) > u n U (x). Thus, for thisq n we have, using the inequalities for y Q,n that
or, since this inequality is valid for any Q n ∈M n that
, where the last equality follows from [32, Proposition 7.1]. We thus obtain the bounds
which, since u n U (x) < 0,q n > 0 implies (B.6), finishing the result.
APPENDIX C. PROOFS FROM SECTION 7
We begin with a lemma ¶ showing how the indifference price scales with the initial position and risk aversion. This is an easy consequence of the fact that A t is a cone: i.e. for each c > 0, (L, M ) ∈ A t ⇔ (cL, cM ) ∈ A t . Throughout, we assume that x, y ∈ R, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , s > 0, a > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1) (resp. λ n ∈ (0, 1)).
Lemma C.1. For p a as in (7.5 ) and q > 0:
Proof of Lemma C.1. For (L, M ) ∈ A t and X, Y as in (7.2) note that
As A t is a cone:
By removing (S T − K) + from the above calculations we obtain from (7.3) and (7.4): with the same inequality also holding for z εn,f . Thus, if lim n↑∞ λ 3 n |y n | = 0 we see that lim n↑∞ p a (y n , q n ; s, t; λ n ) = Ψ(p, t; √ aℓ), which is the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 7.4 . The proof of convergence follows the weak viscosity limits of [3] , see also Chapter VII of [16] . Let us define Step 1: Ψ * (s, t) is a viscosity subsolution to the linear Black-Scholes equation.
Let w(s, t) be a smooth test function and assume that (s 0 , t 0 ) ∈ (0, ∞)×[0, T ] is a strict local maximizer of the difference Ψ * (s, t) − w(s, t) on [0, ∞) × [0, T ] such that Ψ * (s 0 , t 0 ) = w(s 0 , t 0 ). We may, and will do so, assume that w ss (s 0 , t 0 ) = 0. We verify that Ψ * is a viscosity subsolution, by proving that if t 0 < T , then −w t (s 0 , t 0 ) − 1 2 s 2 0 σ 2 w ss (s 0 , t 0 ) ≤ 0, whereas if t 0 = T , then either the previous inequality holds or Ψ * (s 0 , T ) ≤ (s 0 − K) + .
Let us assume that either t 0 < T or that t 0 = T and Ψ * (s 0 , T ) > (s 0 − K) + . Consider a sequence b n ↓ 0 and local maximizers (s n , t n ) ∈ (0, ∞) × [0, T ) of the function (s, t) → Ψ(s, t; b n ) − w(s, t), such that (s n , t n ) → (s 0 , t 0 ), Ψ(s n , t n ; b n ) → Ψ * (s 0 , t 0 ), and Ψ(s n , t n ; b n ) − w(s n , t n ) → 0.
The existence of such a sequence and maximizers is shown in [3] . Notice that for n large enough we have t n < T . Indeed, if t 0 < T , then t n < T for large enough n follows by the convergence t n → t 0 . Let's now assume that t 0 = T and Ψ * (s 0 , T ) > (s 0 − K) + and let t n = T . We calculate Ψ * (s 0 , t 0 ) = lim n→∞ Ψ(s n , T ; b n ) = (s 0 − K) + .
But, since we have assumed that Ψ * (s 0 , T ) > (s 0 − K) + we get a contradiction, which implies that t n < T for all n large enough.
Let us set now k n = Ψ(s n , t n ; b n ) − w(s n , t n ) and define the operator By the fact that Ψ(; b n ) is a continuous viscosity solution of (7.6) and that the function A → A(1+S (A)) is increasing function, we get the following 0 ≥ −w t (s n , t n ) − G bn [w(s n , t n ) + k n ].
Taking now n → ∞ and using the facts that ℓ n → 0, (s n , t n ) → (s 0 , t 0 ), k n → 0 and S(0) = 0, we get −w t (s 0 , t 0 ) − 1 2 σ 2 s 2 0 w ss (s 0 , t 0 ) ≤ 0, completing the proof of the viscosity subsolution property of Ψ * .
Step 2: Ψ * (s, t) is a viscosity supersolution to the linear Black-Scholes equation.
The proof if this step is almost identical to the proof of the previous step. Let w(s, t) be a smooth test function and assume that (s 0 , t 0 ) ∈ (0, ∞) × [0, T ] is a strict global minimizer of the difference Ψ * (s, t) − w(s, t) on [0, ∞) × [0, T ] such that Ψ * (s 0 , t 0 ) = w(s 0 , t 0 ). We may, and will do so, assume that w ss (s 0 , t 0 ) = 0. We verify that Ψ * is a viscosity supersolution, by proving that if t 0 < T , then −w t (s 0 , t 0 ) − 1 2 s 2 σ 2 w ss (s 0 , t 0 ) ≥ 0.
If t 0 = T , then by construction we have the supersolution property Ψ * (s, T ) ≥ (s − K) + . We need to show the viscosity property.
Consider a sequence b n ↓ 0 and local minimizers (s n , t n ) ∈ (0, ∞) × [0, T ) of the function (s, t) → Ψ(s, t; b n ) − w(s, t), such that (s n , t n ) → (s 0 , t 0 ), Ψ(s n , t n ; b n ) → Ψ * (s 0 , t 0 ), and Ψ(s n , t n ; b n ) − w(s n , t n ) → 0.
The existence of such a sequence and minimizers is shown in [3] . Notice that, as in the viscosity subsolution case, for n large enough, we have that t n < T .
By the fact that Ψ(; b n ) is a viscosity solution of (7.6) and that the function A → A(1 + S(A)) is increasing function, we get the following 0 ≤ −w t (s n , t n ) − G bn [w(s n , t n ) + k n ].
Taking now n → ∞ and using the facts that ℓ n → 0, (s n , t n ) → (s 0 , t 0 ), k n → 0 and S(0) = 0, we get −w t (s 0 , t 0 ) − 1 2 σ 2 s 2 0 w ss (s 0 , t 0 ) ≥ 0, completing the proof of the viscosity supersolution property of Ψ * .
Step 3: Putting the estimates together Clearly, ψ is smooth and from the explicit formula for φ(s, t; C) it follows that ψ ss ≥ 0. We then have from (C.8) (writing φ C to denote the dependence upon C) that The quadratic form (1/2)(1 − γ)σ 2 b 2 x 2 + (1/2)(σ 2 − C 2 )x is bounded below by
Plugging this into the above (with s 2 φ C ss playing the role of x) yields
Clearly, setting Proof of Theorem 7.7. We verify that Proposition A.2 holds, yielding the desired result. As a first step towards this direction, we rewrite the involved optimization problem in a form that is easier to work with.
Forp n ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s) recall the optimal sale quantity problem in (7.8):
max q>0 u a (x + ys(1 − λ n ) + qp n , 0, q; s, t; λ n ).
Withx = x + ys(1 − λ n ) we have, in view of (C.3) and (C.4), (C.5), that for q > 0:
u a (x + qp n , 0, q; s, t; λ n ) = 1 a v 1 qa x q +p n , 0, s, t; λ n − 1 = − 1 a e −a x+qp n −qz The existence of a maximizerq n > 0, as well as the asymptotic behavior ofq n /r n in (7.9) as λ n → 0 will follow from Proposition A.2 once the requisite hypotheses are shown to hold. Here, p n is the map q → p n (q) = −z 1 qa (0, s, t; λ n ).
We first consider Assumption A.1. As for bullet point one, note that by Lemma C.2, p n is continuous and non-increasing on (0, ∞). Regarding bullet point two, (C.6) gives −qs(1 + λ n ) ≤ qp n (q) ≤ −qΨ(s, t; 0) + µ 2 2aσ 2 (T − t), so that for any γ > 0 lim sup n↑∞ sup q≤γ q|p n (q)| ≤ γ max Ψ(s, t; 0) + µ 2 2aσ 2 (T − t), γs := C(γ) < ∞, verifying bullet point two. Regarding bullet point three, from (C.7) where ε n = λ 2 n /(aℓ), q n = ℓr n and r n = λ −2 n it holds for all ℓ > 0 that p n (ℓr n ) → −Ψ(s, t; √ aℓ) = p ∞ (ℓ). Thus, bullet point three holds with δ = δ + = ∞. Lastly, regarding bullet point four, since Theorem 7.5 shows that lim ℓ↑∞ Ψ(s, t; √ aℓ) = − lim ℓ↑∞ p ∞ (ℓ) = −s and s > Ψ(s, t; 0) = −p ∞ + (0), bullet point four holds (see the sufficient condition Assumption A.1). Therefore, Assumption A.1 holds. Lastly, as stated above forp ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s) we have Therefore, the results of Proposition A.2 go through, finishing the proof.
